Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash

被引:21
作者
Lopez, Edward J. [1 ]
Jewell, R. Todd
Campbell, Noel D.
机构
[1] San Jose State Univ, Dept Econ, San Jose, CA 95192 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2202/1555-5879.1268
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
In Kelo v. City of New London, the U.S. Supreme Court left it to the states to protect pmpero against takings for economic development. Since Kelo, thirpi-seven states have enacted legislation to update their eminent domain laws. This paper is the first to theoretically and empirically analyze the factors that influence whether, in what manner, and how quickly states change their laws through new legislation. Fourteen of the thirty-seven new laws offer only weak protections against development takings. The legislative response to Kelo was responsive to measures of the backlash but only in the binary decision whether to pass any new law. The decision to enact a meaningful restriction was more a function of relevant political economy measures. States with more economic freedom, greater value of new housing construction, and less racial and income inequality are more Rely to have enacted stronger restrictions, and sooner. Of the thirteen states that have not updated, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Mississippi are highly likely to do so in the future. Hawaii, Massachusetts and New York are unlikely to update at all.
引用
收藏
页码:101 / 135
页数:35
相关论文
共 55 条
[1]   Redistributive public employment [J].
Alesina, A ;
Baqir, R ;
Easterly, W .
JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 2000, 48 (02) :219-241
[2]  
Benson BL, 2005, INDEP REV, V10, P165
[3]  
Berliner D, 2003, PUBLIC POWER PRIVATE
[4]  
BERLINER DANA, 2006, OPENING FLOODGATES E, P1
[5]   DOES ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AFFECT ECONOMIC-POLICY CHOICES - EVIDENCE FROM GUBERNATORIAL TERM LIMITS [J].
BESLEY, T ;
CASE, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1995, 110 (03) :769-798
[6]  
BOYLAN RT, 2003, STATE POLITICS POLIC, V0003
[7]  
*CASTL COAL, 2007, 50 STAT REP CARD TRA
[8]  
Council of State Governments, BOOK STATES
[9]  
COX DR, 1972, J R STAT SOC B, V34, P187
[10]   Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto [J].
de Figueiredo, RJP .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2003, 87 (12) :2677-2701