Plato's Marionette

This paper takes a fresh look at the marionette image introduced by Plato in a famous passage of Book I of the Laws, as he undertakes to explain the bearing of self-rule upon virtue (644B-645E). I argue that the reader of the passage is first offered a cognitive model of a unitary self, presided over by reasoning which prompts bafflement in the Athenian Visitor's interlocutors. The marionette image then in effect undermines that model, by portraying humans as passive subjects of contrary controlling impulses determining their behaviour. Finally the image is complicated and in the end transcended by reintroduction of reasoning as a special kind of divinely inspired impulse, with which one must actively cooperate if animal impulses are to be mastered. I examine the way Plato's reference at this point to law (where there is a key translation problem) should be understood to bear upon the nature of the reasoning in question. In conclusion I comment on what light we may suppose to be thrown by the marionette passage on self-rule, as we are promised it will.