OPTIMAL FORECASTING INCENTIVES

[1] GUESNERIE R, 1984, J PUBLIC ECON, V25, P329, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4

[2] HAIM E, 1982, THESIS U CALIFORNIA

[3] AUCTIONING INCENTIVE CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1987, 95 (05) : 921 - 937

[4] USING COST OBSERVATION TO REGULATE FIRMS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (03) : 614 - 641

[5] MONOPOLY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (02) : 171 - 196

[6] EXPLORATION IN THEORY OF OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (114) : 175 - 208

[7] INFORMATION-ELICITING COMPENSATION SCHEMES [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 27 (01) : 107 - 115

[8] OSBAND K, 1985, 1194 HARV U I EC RES

[9] ROGERSON WP, 1987, OPTIMALITY MENUS LIN

[10] ELICITATION OF PERSONAL PROBABILITIES AND EXPECTATIONS [J]. JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1971, 66 (336) : 783 - 801

[1] GUESNERIE R, 1984, J PUBLIC ECON, V25, P329, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4

[2] HAIM E, 1982, THESIS U CALIFORNIA

[3] AUCTIONING INCENTIVE CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1987, 95 (05) : 921 - 937

[4] USING COST OBSERVATION TO REGULATE FIRMS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (03) : 614 - 641

[5] MONOPOLY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1984, 15 (02) : 171 - 196

[6] EXPLORATION IN THEORY OF OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (114) : 175 - 208

[7] INFORMATION-ELICITING COMPENSATION SCHEMES [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 27 (01) : 107 - 115

[8] OSBAND K, 1985, 1194 HARV U I EC RES

[9] ROGERSON WP, 1987, OPTIMALITY MENUS LIN

[10] ELICITATION OF PERSONAL PROBABILITIES AND EXPECTATIONS [J]. JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, 1971, 66 (336) : 783 - 801