AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO NORMS

被引：1017
作者：
AXELROD, R
机构：
来源：
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW | 1986年 / 80卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1960858
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
引用
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页码：1095 / 1111
页数：17
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