FINITE RATIONALITY AND INTERPERSONAL COMPLEXITY IN REPEATED GAMES

被引：119

作者：

KALAI, E ^{[1
]}

STANFORD, W ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,DEPT ECON,CHICAGO,IL 60680

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911078

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：397 / 410

页数：14

共 27 条

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