TIGHTENING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS - THE BENEFIT-COST OR THE NO-COST PARADIGM

被引:1018
作者
PALMER, K [1 ]
OATES, WE [1 ]
PORTNEY, PR [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV MARYLAND, COLLEGE PK, MD 20742 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.9.4.119
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper takes issue with the Porter-van der Linde claim that traditional benefit-cost analysis is a fundamental misrepresentation of the environmental problem. They contend that stringent environmental measures induce innovative efforts leading to improvements in abatement and production technologies that offset the costs of the regulations. Drawing both on basic economic theory and existing data on control costs, the authors argue that such offsets are special cases. The data indicate offsets are minuscule relative to control costs. There is no free lunch here: environmental programs must justify their costs by the benefits that improved environmental quality provides to society.
引用
收藏
页码:119 / 132
页数:14
相关论文
共 24 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1968, MANAGING WATER QUALI
[2]   STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL-TRADE [J].
BARRETT, S .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1994, 54 (03) :325-338
[3]  
BURTRAW D, 1995, 9530 RES FUT DISC PA
[4]   INNOVATION IN POLLUTION-CONTROL [J].
DOWNING, PB ;
WHITE, LJ .
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 1986, 13 (01) :18-29
[5]  
Gore A., 1992, EARTH BALANCE
[6]   SOCIAL COST OF ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALITY REGULATIONS - A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS [J].
HAZILLA, M ;
KOPP, RJ .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1990, 98 (04) :853-873
[7]  
Horowitz John Keith, 1995, J ECON MANAGE STRAT, V3, p[663, 663]
[8]  
JAFFE AB, 1995, J ECON LIT, V33, P132
[9]   ENVIRONMENTAL-REGULATION AND UNITED-STATES ECONOMIC-GROWTH [J].
JORGENSON, DW ;
WILCOXEN, PJ .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 21 (02) :314-340
[10]   EQUILIBRIUM POLLUTION TAXES IN OPEN ECONOMIES WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION [J].
KENNEDY, PW .
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 1994, 27 (01) :49-63