Epistemic (In)justice, the Virtue of Epistemic Humility and Monotheism

The paper deals with the concept of epistemic or intellectual injustice and situates it in the framework of a discussion about epistemic or intellectual virtues that help us overcome epistemic injustice. A broader research problem is the question of how to understand epistemic injustice, especially if we follow the picture, that truth and rationality are at the centre of our knowledge and other epistemic enterprises. The answer to this question follows the understanding of truth as the telos or the goal of belief, in relation to which we can further divide epistemic virtues into the core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Epistemic justice is an example of an ancillary epistemic virtue, which has the role of helping us overcoming epistemic injustice. The narrower research problem, however, aims at the question of whether religion in general, and monotheism in particular, may be the target as well as the source of epistemic injustice or even epistemic violence. The answer to both aspects of this question is affirmative. At the same time, regarding religion as a source of epistemic injustice, we also highlight the important capabilities of religion(s) to promote and deepen epistemic virtues that reduce or eliminate epistemic injustice and further promote open inter-religious dialogue. One of these capabilities is represented by the virtue of epistemic humility.