Hegel's Interpretation of the Kantian Transcendental Apperception as a Critique and Reelaboration of Kant's Transcendental Logic

The following paper intends to study Hegel's reception of the Kantian transcendental apperception. This study will allow us understand Hegel's critique against Kant's conception of the apperception, Hegel's appropriation of the apperception and how Hegel uses it to promote a critique against transcendental logic as a whole. I claim that Hegel's approach on apperception involves several aspects: First, revealing the true philosophical meaning that Kant had not adverted to in his discovery of apperception. Second, showing that transcendental logic implies an incomplete conception of pure categories and pure thought. Third, I intend to prove that by studying Hegel's approach on the transcendental apperception as a critique to transcendental logic allows us understand Hegel's own speculative logic as a reelaboration of the epistemological limits of pure thought and the conception of the object of knowledge.