ORGANIZATIONAL PROSPECTS, INFLUENCE COSTS, AND OWNERSHIP CHANGES

被引：203

作者：

Meyer, Margaret ^{[1
]}

Milgrom, Paul ^{[2
]}

Roberts, John ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford, Nuffield Coll, Oxford OX1 1NF, England

[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1992年 / 1卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00009.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We augment efficiency-based theories of ownership by including influence costs. Our principal conclusion is that the prospect of organizational decline and layoffs creates additional influence costs in multiunit organizations that would be absent if there was no prospect of layoffs and would be lessened or eliminated in focused organizations. This helps explain the tendency of firms to divest poorly performing units, as well as the pattern of sales of such units to firms already in businesses related to that of the divested unit.

引用

页码：9 / 35

页数：27

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