AN APPROXIMATE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION

被引：39
作者：
FUDENBERG, D
LEVINE, DK
机构：
[1] UNIV MINNESOTA,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455
[2] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1991年 / 54卷 / 01期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0022-0531(91)90103-B
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies repeated games in which players are imperfectly informed about the uncertain consequences of their opponents stage game actions. We show that if the game is informationally connected, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs includes the enforceable mutually punishable set, if the intertemporal criterion is (i) the lim inf time average, or (ii) the limit of ε-equilibria with discount factor δ, and ε → 0 as δ → 1. We also explore the link between these two criterion functions. © 1991.
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收藏
页码：26 / 47
页数：22
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