ASSET MARKETS AS AN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION MECHANISM - COORDINATION FAILURE, GAME FORM AUCTIONS, AND TACIT COMMUNICATION

被引：92

作者：

VANHUYCK, JB ^{[1
]}

BATTALIO, RC ^{[1
]}

BEIL, RO ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] AUBURN UNIV,DEPT ECON,AUBURN,AL 36849

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1993年 / 5卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1993.1026

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication, which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game. We find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem. Specifically, behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate, but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C720, G120. © 1993 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：485 / 504

页数：20