REPUTATION IN REPEATED 2ND-PRICE AUCTIONS

被引:61
作者
BIKHCHANDANI, S
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D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(88)90151-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:97 / 119
页数:23
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