PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE

被引：824
作者：
MILGROM, P [1 ]
ROBERTS, J [1 ]
机构：
[1] STANFORD UNIV, GRAD SCH BUSINESS, STANFORD, CA 94305 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1982年 / 27卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-X
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：280 / 312
页数：33
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