EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE IN ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES

被引：13

作者：

AGRAWAL, A ^{[1
]}

MAKHIJA, AK ^{[1
]}

MANDELKER, GN ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PITTSBURGH, PITTSBURGH, PA 15260 USA

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 1991年 / 20卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3665717

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study how the composition of the board of directors and incentives from direct shareholdings affect firm performance in a sample of large, publicly traded firms. We use an instrumental variables approach that controls directly for endogeneity of both shareholdings and board composition. We find no evidence that cross-sectional patterns in board composition are correlated with cross-sectional patterns in performance. This result is consistent with a number of different explanations, all of which suggest that potential regulation of board composition would not be beneficial. Similar to the previous literature, we find a nonmonotonic relation between ownership and performance. Our results suggest that this relation is not a product of the endogeneity of shareholdings. Finally, we find that firm performance suffers if the CEO stays on too long (beyond 15 years).

引用

页码：113 / 124

页数：12

共 28 条

[1] MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE-INVESTMENT AND FINANCING DECISIONS [J].