The control of Public Administration by the Judiciary in times of neoconstitutionalism: the limits of judicial activism in concretization of fundamental rights in protection to administrative merit

The perspectives of the judicial control of the acts of the Public Administration in the light of the transformations undergone in the contemporary constitutional theory is the subject put in debate. It is intended from a simple homage to the capital work of Professor Sergio de Andrea Ferreira "The Control of Public Administration by the Judiciary" to verify to what extent the rise of a new theoretical-institutional modeling of the constitutional jurisdiction in the light of the promotion of fundamental rights does not can import into undue narrowing of the legitimate space of administrative merit. In order to do so, the work is divided into three parts, investigating the limits and possibilities of administrative merit in the light of the Democratic Rule of Law, the expansion of control and rise of the Judiciary with the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the role of constitutional jurisdiction in promotion of fundamental rights, but in order to guarantee the protection of administrative merit while irradiating the democratic principle. The dialectical criticism is adopted by methodology with a primary purpose in the legal literature of the mother country and foreign. It is concluded that under the aegis of a Democratic State of Law, it is not for the constitutional jurisdiction to protect the constitutional goods and values, for the emptying of the majority principle and its irradiation by the Public Administration through its densification in administrative merit. On the contrary, it is clear that under the aegis of a pluralistic constitutional order, which consecrates multiple and varied interests, it is incumbent on the constitutional sharing not to the Judiciary, but on the State Administration to promote the realization of constitutional rights under penalty of own democratic principle.