ON REPEATED MORAL HAZARD WITH DISCOUNTING

被引：280

作者：

SPEAR, SE

SRIVASTAVA, S

机构：

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1987年 / 54卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297484

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：599 / 617

页数：19

共 12 条

[1] OPTIMAL CARTEL EQUILIBRIA WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING [J].

ABREU, D ;

PEARCE, D ;

STACCHETTI, E .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) :251-269

[2]

ABREU D, 1982, REPEATED GAMES DISCO

[3] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01) :74-91

[4] LONG-TERM-CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD [J].

LAMBERT, RA .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02) :441-452

[5]

Luenberger D.G., 1997, OPTIMIZATION VECTOR

[6] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J].

RADNER, R .

ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (05) :1173-1198

[7] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J].

RADNER, R .

ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) :1127-1148

[8] REPEATED MORAL HAZARD [J].

ROGERSON, WP .

ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (01) :69-76

[9] THE 1ST ORDER APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS [J].

ROGERSON, WP .

ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (06) :1357-1367

[10]

ROGERSON WP, 1983, REPEATED MORAL HAZAR

← 1 2 →