OPTIMAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN GENERALIZED PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEMS

被引：453
作者：
MYERSON, RB
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1982年 / 10卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：67 / 81
页数：15
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