ROBUST PORTFOLIO DECISIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The present paper aims to study a robust-entropic optimal control problem arising in the management of financial institutions. More precisely, we consider an economic agent who manages the portfolio of a financial firm. The manager has the possibility to invest part of the firm's wealth in a classical Black-Scholes type financial market, and also, as the firm is exposed to a stochastic cash flow of liabilities, to proportionally transfer part of its liabilities to a third party as a means of reducing risk. However, model uncertainty aspects are introduced as the manager does not fully trust the model she faces, hence she decides to make her decision robust. By employing robust control and dynamic programming techniques, we provide closed form solutions for the cases of the (i) logarithmic; (ii) exponential and (iii) power utility functions. Moreover, we provide a detailed study of the limiting behavior, of the associated stochastic differential game at hand, which, in a special case, leads to break down of the solution of the resulting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation. Finally, we present a detailed numerical study that elucidates the effect of robustness on the optimal decisions of both players.