CORPORATE FINANCIAL HEDGING WITH PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

被引：87

作者：

DEMARZO, PM ^{[1
]}

DUFFIE, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,GRAD SCH BUSINESS,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1991年 / 53卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(91)90156-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If a firm has information pertinent to its own dividend stream that is not made available to its shareholders, it may be in the interests of the firm and its shareholders to adopt a financial hedging policy. This is in contrast with the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, which implies that, with informational symmetry, such financial hedging is irrelevant. In certain cases, hedging policies are identified that are unanimously supported by shareholders. © 1991.

引用

页码：261 / 286

页数：26

共 20 条

[1] A NOISY RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM FOR MULTI-ASSET SECURITIES MARKETS [J].