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REGULATORY OPTIONS AND PRICE-CAP REGULATION
被引:21
作者
:
LEWIS, TR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
BELLCORE,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960
BELLCORE,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960
LEWIS, TR
[
1
]
SAPPINGTON, DEM
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
BELLCORE,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960
BELLCORE,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960
SAPPINGTON, DEM
[
1
]
机构
:
[1]
BELLCORE,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960
来源
:
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
|
1989年
/ 20卷
/ 03期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.2307/2555579
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
引用
收藏
页码:405 / 416
页数:12
相关论文
共 6 条
[1]
BARON D. P., 1984, BAYESIAN MODELS EC T
[2]
REGULATION, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND AUDITING
[J].
BARON, DP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BARON, DP
;
BESANKO, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BESANKO, D
.
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1984,
15
(04)
:447
-470
[3]
MONITORING, MORAL HAZARD, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND RISK SHARING IN PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING
[J].
BARON, DP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BARON, DP
;
BESANKO, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BESANKO, D
.
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1987,
18
(04)
:509
-532
[4]
MANAGING SUPPLIER SWITCHING
[J].
DEMSKI, JS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
DEMSKI, JS
;
SAPPINGTON, DEM
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
SAPPINGTON, DEM
;
SPILLER, PT
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
SPILLER, PT
.
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1987,
18
(01)
:77
-97
[5]
USING COST OBSERVATION TO REGULATE FIRMS
[J].
LAFFONT, JJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
LAFFONT, JJ
;
TIROLE, J
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
TIROLE, J
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1986,
94
(03)
:614
-641
[6]
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
[J].
MYERSON, RB
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MYERSON, RB
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1979,
47
(01)
:61
-73
←
1
→
共 6 条
[1]
BARON D. P., 1984, BAYESIAN MODELS EC T
[2]
REGULATION, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND AUDITING
[J].
BARON, DP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BARON, DP
;
BESANKO, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BESANKO, D
.
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1984,
15
(04)
:447
-470
[3]
MONITORING, MORAL HAZARD, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND RISK SHARING IN PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING
[J].
BARON, DP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BARON, DP
;
BESANKO, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401
BESANKO, D
.
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1987,
18
(04)
:509
-532
[4]
MANAGING SUPPLIER SWITCHING
[J].
DEMSKI, JS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
DEMSKI, JS
;
SAPPINGTON, DEM
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
SAPPINGTON, DEM
;
SPILLER, PT
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
SPILLER, PT
.
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1987,
18
(01)
:77
-97
[5]
USING COST OBSERVATION TO REGULATE FIRMS
[J].
LAFFONT, JJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
LAFFONT, JJ
;
TIROLE, J
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
TIROLE, J
.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1986,
94
(03)
:614
-641
[6]
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
[J].
MYERSON, RB
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MYERSON, RB
.
ECONOMETRICA,
1979,
47
(01)
:61
-73
←
1
→