CHAIN STORE PARADOX

[1] [Anonymous], 1944, THEORY GAME EC BEHAV

[2] AUMANN RJ, 1964, ADV GAME THEORY, P627

[3] BUSH RR, 1955, STOCHASTIC MODELS LE

[4] DOLLARD, 1939, FRUSTRATION AGRESSIO

[5] EVANS GW, 1966, J PERSONALITY SOCIAL, V6, P486

[6] Festinger L., 1957, THEORY COGNITIVE DIS

[7] FORMAT EFFECTS IN PRISONERS DILEMMA GAME [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1973, 17 (04) : 719 - 744

[8] Kuhn H., 1953, ANN MATH STUD, V28, P193

[9] FACTORS AFFECTING CO-OPERATION IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 1965, 10 (01): : 26 - 38

[10] AN EMPIRICAL-APPROACH TO THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1962, 76 (03) : 424 - 436

[1] [Anonymous], 1944, THEORY GAME EC BEHAV

[2] AUMANN RJ, 1964, ADV GAME THEORY, P627

[3] BUSH RR, 1955, STOCHASTIC MODELS LE

[4] DOLLARD, 1939, FRUSTRATION AGRESSIO

[5] EVANS GW, 1966, J PERSONALITY SOCIAL, V6, P486

[6] Festinger L., 1957, THEORY COGNITIVE DIS

[7] FORMAT EFFECTS IN PRISONERS DILEMMA GAME [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1973, 17 (04) : 719 - 744

[8] Kuhn H., 1953, ANN MATH STUD, V28, P193

[9] FACTORS AFFECTING CO-OPERATION IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 1965, 10 (01): : 26 - 38

[10] AN EMPIRICAL-APPROACH TO THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1962, 76 (03) : 424 - 436