THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET AND CORPORATE FINANCING, DIVIDEND, AND COMPENSATION POLICIES

被引：1488
作者：
SMITH, CW
WATTS, RL
机构：
[1] University of Rochester, Rochester
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 1992年 / 32卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0304-405X(92)90029-W
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We examine explanations for corporate financing-, dividend-, and compensation-policy choices. We document robust empirical relations among corporate policy decisions and various firm characteristics. Our evidence suggests contracting theories are more important in explaining cross-sectional variation in observed financial, dividend, and compensation policies than either tax-based or signaling theories.
引用
收藏
页码：263 / 292
页数：30
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