Habits, affects and reflexivity: A pragmatist model of social cooperation following Dewey and Mead

Both, theories of practice and the pragmatism of Dewey and Mead refuse exaggerated cognitivistic positions in social theory and emphasize pre-reflexive habits. In contrast to theories of practice, pragmatism not only analyses the pre-reflexive intentions of the body but also the conditions of their transformation. Pre-reflexive habits are based on immediate experiences which are always imbued by affective moods and emotions. These ‘judgments of the body’ can be reflexively reviewed in problematic situations. They are verbalized via processes of articulation and thus can be transferred into an intersubjective definition of the situation. The proposed pragmatist theory of habits, affectivity and reflexivity has diverse consequences for social and political theory. Transformations of affectively imbued habits and dispositions can be explained by a model of learning that Dewey proposed with regard to intelligent habits of problem solving. This model has consequences for a theory of democracy focusing on the habitual and affective bases of deliberative processes of communication. © 2013, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.