Contrastivism and Skepticism

被引：0

作者：

Luper, Steven ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Trinity Univ, San Antonio, TX 78212 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF SKEPTICISM | 2012年 / 2卷 / 01期

关键词：

skepticism; contrastivism; knowledge; closure; Schaffer;

D O I：

10.1163/221057011X588019

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Recently, Jonathan Schaffer (and others) has defended a contrastivist analysis of knowledge. By appealing to his account, he has attempted to steer a path between skepticism and Moorestyle antiskepticism: much like sensitivity theorists and contextualists, he offers significant concessions to, but ultimately rejects, both. In this essay I suggest that in fact Schaffer ends up succumbing to skepticism.

引用

页码：51 / 58

页数：8

共 8 条

[1] Dretske F., 1971, AUSTRALAS J PHILOS, V49, P1
[2] EPISTEMIC OPERATORS
DRETSKE, FI
[J]. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1970, 67 (24) : 1007 - 1023
[3] Elusive knowledge
Lewis, D
[J]. AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 1996, 74 (04) : 549 - 567
[4] Luper Steven, 2010, STANFORD ENCY PHILOS
[5] Nozick R., 1981, PHILOS EXPLANATIONS
[6] Pritchard D. H, 2008, SOC EPISTEMOL, V22, P305
[7] Schaffer J., 2008, SOC EPISTEMOL, V22, P235
[8] Closure, contrast, and answer
Schaffer, Jonathan
[J]. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2007, 133 (02) : 233 - 255

← 1 →