EXCESS CAPACITY AND COLLUSION

被引:99
作者
DAVIDSON, C [1 ]
DENECKERE, R [1 ]
机构
[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2527159
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:521 / 541
页数:21
相关论文
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